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Cavell and Holderlin
on Human Immigrancy
Richard Eldridge
. . . beginning no doubt with the strangeness of oneself.
—Stanley Cavell, A Pitch of Philosophy, xv

D escribing the ambition of ordinary language philosophy and taking it as his
own, Stanley Cavell remarks that the ordinary language philosopher's "problem [in
proceeding from what is ordinarily said] is to discover the specific plight of mind
and circumstance within which a human being gives voice to his condition."' This
ambition can be variously pursued in autobiographical writing, in poetry, and in
criticism, as well as in ordinary language philosophy.
One way to pursue it would be to arrive, or to claim to arrive, at a final
discovery of the human condition: to announce, for example, that we are immortal
souls capable of eternal knowledge, in substantial union with a mortal, material
body; or that we are nothing but congeries of atoms,- or that we are made in
the image of a God of justice and love, thence to take one's bearings from that
announcement. This is roughly the way of dogmatic philosophy, in seeking final
results—^ultimate characterizations of our condition, vouchsafed to us from an
encounter with the dictates of reason alone, or with reality as such, material or
divine, as the case may be.
One does not have to be a hyperbolic skeptic to be suspicious of this ambi
tion, articulated and worked out in this way. What are the criteria of an encounter
with reason or reality alone? How might any such announcement, even to oneself,
be trusted? But there is another, more distinctly critical way to follow this ambition,
proceeding, as it were, from within the continual having of it. This latter way
eschews the ultimacy of any discovery of our condition in favor of tracing—
and sharing in—swerves between self-composure and self-abandonment on an
eccentric path: as though one found oneself along with other human beings whose
expressions of their plight one might read as neighbors to one's own, always in
medias res between nothingness and at-homeness with oneself, others, and the
world, in living composedly according to reason and the nature of things. Here
the ambition to discover our condition so as to take one's bearings persists, but this
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condition is experienced as a continuing plight within which one comes to voice
and judgment, rather than as an object of knowledge that voice and judgment
might master.
This latter way of thinking within a continuing ambition of human selfdiscovery is not easy to articulate. (Any characterization of how one might or must
so think itself uneasily verges on dogmatism.) The claim that this way of thinking is
appropriate to what we are cannot be justified by any argument that would satisfy
anyone committed to standards of demonstrative proof independent of any appeal
to a transfiguration of perception. Some might see that this is how things are—
that we always live thus in medias res—and some might not. But there can be no
demonstrative rational proof of the ultimate correctness of this critical view.
This perception of our condition can, however, be filled in persuasively by
elaborating readings of various responses to that condition. ^ Such elaborated read
ings might invite acknowledgment, even if they are unable to command it, and
in doing so might serve to keep open lines of reflection and conversation with
others and within oneself, rather than short-circuiting them into avoidance and
repression. Or they may not. That there is at least a way of thinking philosoph
ically and poetically and critically, through the elaboration of readings of our
condition, aiming at acknowledgment, and that this way of thinking is a distinctive
and potentially valuable realization of philosophy and of our condition are things
that I will try to suggest by juxtaposing some Wittgensteinian thoughts about the
strangeness of language as our almost habitation, Cavell's diagnoses of philosophy's
motives, and some pieces of Friedrich Holderlin's philosophy and poetry. Such
a juxtaposition might help fill in a distinctively romantic shape of thinking so
conceived, pointing toward romantic articulations of our mindedness—at once
philosophical, poetic, and critical—under which we might acknowledge ourselves
to fall and which we might come to see to be in play in literature, in criticism, and
in human life.

1
When we are not thinking philosophically, or otherwise not overcome by wonder
at the sheer existence of the world before us, we find words to be familiar objects
of use. They come to the tongue and hand as thought comes to the mind. But it is
also possible, when in the grip of philosophy or wonder, for words to strike us as
strange. Wittgenstein notes this experience of the strangeness of words; "Suppose
I had agreed on a code with someone,- 'tower' means bank. 1 tell him. 'Now go to
the tower'—he understands me and acts accordingly, but he feels the word 'tower'
to be strange [fremdartig] in this use, it has not yet 'taken on' the meaning." Or the
effect of strangeness can be produced by simply repeating a word: you would be
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missing something "if you did not fee! that a word lost its meaning and became a
mere sound if it was repeated ten times over."’ What are the sources and meanings
of this joint familiarity and strangeness?
Spoken and written words are there in one's early childhood environment as
aural and visual stimuli if not yet as objects of recognition as words, before one
comes to master any of them. They circulate among others who are in control of
their own bodies and who attend to their own needs. A dim half recognition—
not yet voiced and conceptually structured—of one's dependence on these others
inhabits this not yet conceptually conscious quasi experience of one's environment.
(Cavell, in describing this condition in which speech and conceptual thought are
yet beyond and above us, notes with approval Rousseau's remark that the first
encounter in the state of nature with another human being will "produce the name
'giant.'") “
Then, after a time, speech and thought come, at first haltingly and in spe
cific domains and then with an astonishing rapidity of fluency and generality.
What has happened? One has come to share with others—in part at least, and
mysteriously—a world of speech, thought, and recognitive perception. Wonder
at the joint familiarity and strangeness of words is bound up with wonder at this
accomplishment. How have 1, by trafficking in unseen ways, with these sounds
and marks—how have 1 come to do this thing? If I concentrate on these sounds
and marks as sounds and marks, then they seem awkward and inert. If 1 simply use
them in accomplished speech and writing and thought, then a grasp of the basis of
their life passes me by, as 1 am caught within their flow. Just how and how far do 1
share a world of speech and writing and thought with others? What have 1 done?
One way to respond to this primitive perplexity—the way of dogmatic phi
losophy, or of what Cavell calls "skepticism"—is to attempt to settle it intellec
tually: to articulate and confirm rationally an exact account of the nature and
limits of this achievement, so as to still any latent anxieties. (A second way is
simply to repress this perplexity. This is not always or even often dishonorable,
but it involves giving oneself over wholly to conventions of thought and language.
These conventions might prove untrustworthy, or one might feel one's life in
subscribing to them not to be the fruit of one's own will.) This intellectual effort
has a natural appeal. If we could know how we, and others, have come to language
and thought, and we could know how far we share conventions, and how apt those
conventions are to the world and to our thinkings, then the risks we run in speaking
would be diminished, even settled. Instead of facing moments of repudiation and
misunderstanding as we venture forth in words ('That is not it at all, / That is
not what I meant, at all"),’ we might speak and think in full assurance that all is
in order in our speech and thought, in their relations with the world and with
others. Dogmatic philosophy, or skepticism, by raising questions about how we
come, or might come, to thought and language, keeps open the primitive quasi
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experience of our accession to language in which, it may well seem, we all share.
This accession remains marked by unsureness about its nature and anxiety over
its potential repudiability. In Cavell's phrasing, skepticism "names our wish (and
the possibility of our wishing) to strip ourselves of the responsibility we have in
meaning (or in failing to mean) one thing, or one way, rather than another."®
To the extent—and how shall this extent be measured? from what position
and perceptions?—that our perplexity with language and with our own thinking
is primitive and that skepticism and dogmatic philosophy arise out of it, they are
unavoidable unless we repress them. The human experience of coming to language
and thought moves us toward querying their bases philosophically in hopes of
perfecting away our risks. In Cavell's formulation,
there is inherent in philosophy a certain drive to the inhuman, to a certain
inhuman idea of intellectuality, or of completion, or of the systematic . . .
that exactly because it is a drive to the inhuman, it is somehow itself the most
inescapably human of motivations. The quest for the inhuman is an essential
part of the motivation to skepticism. And it is a reason why . . . skepticism
is forever an inherent aspiration of the thing we know as human. ^
The philosophical effort to discover in something given (intellect, or matter,
or God) the bases of language and thought emerges here as an all too human
"attempt to convert the human condition, the condition of humanity, into an
intellectual difficulty, a riddle" (CR, 493), something to be solved and done with.
Sometimes this effort will take the form of positing a power of inner recognition,
prior to all instructions and stimuli—a fantasy of a private language. 'This may
be seen as part of philosophy's denial of my powerlessness (over the world, over
others, over myself, over language) by demanding that all power seem to originate
with me, and in isolation." Or sometimes it will take the form of seeing actions
and utterances as nothing but materially caused events, caught up in nature's own
meaningless course. "It may be seen as philosophy's denial of my power (such as it
may be) by sublimizing the power of the world, or say nature" (PP, 112-13).
Either way, and whether or not the philosophical effort is worked out in any
specific, articulate shape, it may well seem that we live caught between fantasies
of perfect power in thought, action, and speech, on the one hand, and of freedom
from responsibility and escape into powerlessness by way of acceptance of or sub
mission to the world, on the other. If one has this perception of our "betweenness"
in exercising our powers in the world—our immigrant not quite at-homeness, not
quite homelessness—then it may seem important not to deny this perceived fact
of the continuance of fantasies, drives, ambitions, wishes, and frustrations: "I say
this struggle with skepticism, with its threat or temptation, is endless: I mean to
say that it is human, it is the human drive to transcend itself, make itself inhuman,
which should not end until, as in Nietzsche, the human is over."®
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It seems impossible to escape the sways of context and the ways of others
in having words that are there before one. Without those sways and ways, there
are no criteria of recognition, no chances of thought speaking only to itself alone.
There is no room to insert thought between the world and these sways and ways.
"[l]t makes no sense at all to give a general explanation for the generality of language,
because it makes no sense at all to suppose words in general might not recur [—in
actual usages—], that we might possess a name for a thing (say 'chair' or 'feeding'
and yet be willing to call nothing (else) 'the same thing'" (CR, 188). This means,
among other things, that the risks of misfiring in attempting to extend words to
new things as others do are, even if necessarily rarely realized (at least in extreme
forms), necessarily also perennial. "[I]f utterances could not fail, they would not be
the human actions under consideration, indeed not the actions of humans at all
(PR 85).
Nor, however, are we given over wholly to powerlessness and to unthinking
submission to the natural. We bear responsibility, to ourselves and to others, for
how we extend our words and how we think and act. There arises for us a question
about what we ought to do or desire, or what it is best for us to do or desire, no
matter what we in fact do or desire. (Thus Heidegger: "Dasein is an entity which
does not just occur among other entities. Rather it is ontically distinguished by the
fact that, in its very Being, that Being is an issue for it.")’ In this questioning (or its
suppression), and in the bearing of responsibility, the self displays itself "as a thing
existing in perpetual relation to itself... as a thing of cares and commitments,
one which to exist has to find itself." In thinking and speaking, as things that we
do and for which we bear responsibility, we find ourselves caught up in the "self's
judgmental forming of itself, as something to be further possessed or overcome."
To be so caught up is to be cast always en route toward the perfection of action
and responsibility, toward a kind of horizonal, fully expressive action, in which
thought and gesture inform one another wholly, in transparency to each other, to
oneself, and to others, to be cast on a "journey to freedom."'®
Between self-standing, perfect power and abandonment to powerlessness,
there is the fact—if it is a fact—of human immigrancy, as we ever seek at-homeness
in the world, in our bodies, in our actions, in our thoughts: seek perfect expres
siveness. "[T]he human necessity of the quest for home and the human fact of
immigrancy are seen together as aspects of the human as such" (PP, 47).

2
Within this conception (or perception) of the standing immigrancy of the human,
a critical path in reading and thinking will involve trying to find "ways to prevent
[the impulse to self-scrutiny] from defeating itself so easily" (CR, 176), either in
complacent intellectual revelation or in self-dramatizing intellectual skepticism.
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Instead of arriving at final results that would either cure our immigrancy or ab
solutize it skeptically so as to kill our ambition to overcome it, thinking must
rather come to terms with it, in what Cavell describes as "the achievement of the
unpolemical, of the refusal to take sides in metaphysical positions. . . Managing
this achievement will involve reading the texts and lives of others, and one's own
texts and life, as expressions of this immigrancy and of the motives with which
we inhabit it. In this perception philosophers—and poets, and critics, and people
generally—"have left us with a trail of images of themselves preparing for philoso
phy or recovering from it" {PP, 22, 3) These images can be read in the discernment
of the ambitions, wishes, strategies, and frustrations that motivate them.
Reading these images, and doing so in awareness of one's own participation in
the human motives that animate them, will differ from any interpretive procedure
controlled by a definite method that yields predictable results. It will be unlike de
Manian deconstruction, which finds always the same aporias and indeterminacies
and so theatricalizes our positions as readers and subjects by calling attention to
ourselves rather than to the specific play of motives and pursuits in the text and
subject under consideration. 'To conclude that such issues are undecidable . . .
theatricalizes the threat, or the truth, of skepticism."” It will be unlike some sorts
of New Historicist criticism, those which reduce texts to reflections of a social life
with an independent logic, involving power dynamics independently laid down
and of which the interpreter is master. Instead, both social life and one's own
stances in reading will be seen to involve plays of motives and fantasy that are
already present, or present under transformations, in the text under study. And
it will be unlike formalism or New Criticism in connecting the paradoxical self
crossings and self-reference of literary form with plays of human motives to pursue
freedom and expressiveness rather than taking texts as self-standing objects of
purely absorptive-perceptual interest. One will see not only the form but the
human subject—that is, oneself—in the form and in its expression of one's own
motives.
Reading in discernment of the human motives that give birth to philosophy,
motives in which one shares, will mean adopting a stance next to the text, between
sheer submission to it and sheer control over it. It will mean both noting and
oneself reenacting the play of energy and limit in the text, thus revealing it as
a precursor of one's own response to it. Unlike method-driven criticism, it will
involve suspending one's sense of what the answers to philosophical questions must
be, keeping open the space of the unpolemical expression of our plight. "[T]he
reader would have to ask himself or herself 'Do I know what philosophy can—and
cannot—do?'
Yet criticism or reading here will also be more than a collection of scattered
and unrelated apergus. While the (philosophical) motives to freedom, expressive
ness, and the subliming away of responsibility that are under discernment are
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tangled and self-criticizing, for they involve commitments both to independence
and common attachment, and while the fruits that their pursuits may lead to
remain unclear, they are nonetheless, in this perception, not accidental. They are
essentially connected—and so this way of reading both perceives and reenacts—
with our lives as subjects, as creatures who are minded and in possession (we know
not how) of language. (It is Wittgenstein's sense of his having a share in these
motives that, for Cavell, finally distinguishes his writing from Austin's.)'^ Hence
the thought arises, when, in reading, one shares in these essential motives, "that the
human is representative, say, imitative, that each life is exemplary of all, a parable
of each" (PP, 11).
What one may variously call motives to philosophy, or to freedom, or to
expressiveness, or to intimacy wedded to independence, or to a kingdom of ends,
are worked into the very structure of our conceptual consciousness, into our being
aUe to reflect on our own judgmental activity and to deliberate. These motives
have to do with "the formation of moral consciousness as such,"''* indeed with
the formation of judgmental consciousness as such, where judgments are always
among our deeds, hence bound up with matters of responsibility and possibilities
of reflective assessment. We have the sense of ourselves as both in need of and open
to guidance, as we assess or can assess our doings. This is enough for philosophy,
as a way of both thinking about and sharing in the terms of these assessments of
what we do freely and what dully, or under constraint, or without interest, to get
started. "[PJhilosophy begins with . . . and may at any time encounter an aspiration
toward ... a sense of itself as guiding the soul, or self, from self-imprisonment
toward the light or instinct of freedom."'^
Insofar as we share in these tangled motives to freedom, or to philosophy,
there is for us "no assurance of, or only relative finality to, human identity" {PP, 121)
as possessors of rational and deliberative capacities and capacities for a free life.
We are cast, both with others and with ourselves, between acknowledgment and
avoidance, between accepting the common as our home and aversively asserting
our own independence. (This is perhaps the place to remark that Cavell almost
follows Hegel's great turning point, in which the desire to know is seen as absorbed
into a prior desire for a free life with oneself and with others. It is no accident
that a central term for human achievement in both Cavell and Hegel, in seeing
problems of knowledge as the obverse face of problems of human relations, is
"acknowledgment" \_Anerkennun^\ The difference is that, for Cavell, the desire for a
free life remains an ideal that is irrepudiable, but less than clearly fully satisfiable,
so that the desire for a free life is continually threatened with collapse back into a
desire to know how to lead a free life that is not yet present.The threat or truth
of skepticism cannot be evaded by a turn to the practical.) Lacking more assurance
than this, but not simply despairing of finding any, we will find ourselves asking
the questions that Cavell asks and that, within this perception, the most serious
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writers will be seen to find inevitable as they go about their recountings: Am 1
known (to myself and to others)? What have I done? How am 1 now to go on?'^

3
So much can be gleaned from a Wittgensteinian vision of language and mind in
conjunction with a Cavellian reading of it. Is it convincing? There can be, again,
no neutral, demonstrative argument in favor if it, independent of the focusing or
transfiguring of a perception of our condition. But it may help to elaborate the
depth and imaginative appeal of this vision of our immigrant condition to see how
much it shares with Holderlin's philosophical romanticism and its consequences in
Holderlin's poetic practice. The following features are central to both a CavellianWittgensteinian and a Holderlinian understanding of the immigrancy of human
conceptual consciousness.
First, there is a specific inheritance of and responsiveness to Kant's critical
turn, in particular to Kant's sense that there are human rational powers whose pos
session calls us from within our mindedness toward a somehow free and elevated
life. The apt exercise of these powers is, however, betrayed by any effort to guide
them by reference to some given external reality to be discovered. Instead, the
possession of these powers is to make us capable of a certain orientation toward
and with one another and the world, from within our having of them. Cavell notes
that
In Kant's interpretation of a fundamental Platonic picture, the individual self
has as it were internalized the sensuous and the super-sensuous worlds—
Plato's unreal and real realms. These are now two "standpoints" which it is
the condition of being human to be able to adopt in succession, in opposition
to each other. ... In Kant's Foundations the turn from one realm to the other
takes place in every moral judgment each time you stop to think, to ask
yourself your way. . . . [AJfter Kant, the journey to freedom has been cut
short—to a half step—^you see how to take it, and where it lies, or you do
not. (PP, 143)
Similarly, Holderlin describes in his letters his own sense of the importance of
Kant's intimation of possibilities of elevation from within, both for himself and for
his culture.
The new circumstances in which 1 live are now the best ones imaginable. 1
have much leisure for my own work, and philosophy is once again my almost
exclusive occupation. I have taken Kant and Reinhold and hope to collect my
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spirit in this element which was dispelled and weakened by fruitless efforts
of which you were a witness. . . . Kant is the Moses of our nation who leads
it out of the Egyptian apathy. . . .'*
Second, there is a sense of mixed fallenness from and elevation out of nature, a
sense of an arche-separation from self-enclosed nature in the having of conceptualjudgmental consciousness and deliberative capacities. For Cavell, there is no gen
eral explanation—no philosophical explanation over and above the humdrum facts
of teaching and training and imitating and, mostly, going on from them—of how
we come to possess language and to be distinctively minded in that possession.
Once that happens, we are both cursed with partiality, or not quite at-homeness
in our mindedness in language and culture, and blessed with possibilities of per
fection. For Holderlin, "Judgment. In the highest and strictest sense, is the original
separation of object and subject. . . that separation through which alone object
and subject become possible, the arcbe-separation."'^ Despite its pains, this archeseparation dimly enables us to do something, to live freely and in celebration of
our mindedness in nature, if we can but learn to express aright what is highest,
to live religiously, in Holderlin's poetic sense of the term. "Here there can yet be
spoken about the uniting of several religions into one, where each one honors his
god and all together honor a communal one in poetic representations,- where each
one celebrates his higher life and all together celebrate a communal higher life,
the celebration of life [as such]."^“
Third, in bearing the possibility and problem of a higher, free life, there is a
specific sense of wandering. Our reorientation is to arise from the release of our
latent capacities and possibilities, but these capacities and possibilities are crossed
or tangled, admitting of no ready, univocal expression guided by knowledge of
an external object. Cavell holds that "we live lives simultaneously of absolute
separateness and endless commonness" (PP, vii). In consequence, attachment or
reattachment to the common can come as either a balm for painful isolation or
a confinement that compromises independence,- assertions of apartness can either
mark out a new and vital expressive path or enact a fall into narcissistic emptiness.
There is no way to know specifically how to go forward fruitfully—no criterion
of a life of freedom that is vouchsafed to us by external objects—independently
of trying one's powers in a mixture of engagement with and departure from the
common, and then waiting. (The truth of skepticism names our wish to know,
and our impossibility of knowing, in advance how to go forward fruitfully, with
absolute assurance.)
Holderlin holds that "the infinite, like the spirit of the states and of the
world, cannot be grasped other than from an askew perspective."^' The infinite,
the spirit of the world, cannot be seen straight on so as to yield direct and reliable
knowledge of how to enact it. We are cast, always, on "an eccentric path,"''^ in
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pursuit simultaneously of love and selfhood, community and autonomy. In Dieter
Henrich's memorable summary of Holderlin's sense of human life,
Conscious life is at once shaped and unbalanced by the basic conflicting
tendencies orienting it. And the formative process of life aims at finding a
balance and a harmony amid this strife, in which no one tendency is entirely
suppressed or denied in its own right. The preface to the fragment of Hyperion
already identifies the highest and most beautiful state humanly attainable as
the ability to withstand what is greatest, and yet to be humbled by what
is smallest. . . . [Man] is bound to a world that, like himself, originates in
opposition. For the sake of unity he strives actively beyond each of its
boundaries. Yet in it he at once confronts the beautiful—an anticipation of
the unity that is lost to him and that he seeks to restore. As he embraces the
beautiful, the complete truth, which lies at an infinite distance, is realized for
him within limits. He is thus captivated by it, and for good reason. But he
must not forget that his active nature is called upon to overcome the finite.
In the conflict of love and selfhood he runs his course, either errantly or with
self-understanding. ”
An eccentric path moves jaggedly about a self-divided center—the longed-for
unification of love and selfhood,- the common and the individual,- the passional
and the reflective—drawn by it into abrupt movements, as a moth is drawn to a
flame, but never mastering or possessing it.

4
What would it be to move along such an eccentric path, or to run one's course, with
understanding There can be no univocal and formulable answer to this question. Any
univocal and formulable answer would have to rest on a complete conceptual grasp
of the self-divided center that draws yet escapes us. A univocal and formulable
answer would put an end to our wandering or immigrancy. In the romantic vision
of our condition as always in medias res, always on an eccentric path, any claim to
have arrived at a final conception of how to live with understanding must appear as
a piece of hubristic dogmatism that is belied by the fact of our movement. Instead
of answers, there can at best only be enactments, or expressions, or acknowledg
ments, of our immigrancy and of the possibilities that we bear and that captivate us.
At best, these might know themselves, or those who give birth to them might know
them to be enactments, expressions, or acknowledgments of a subject's position on
a path, rather than items of external knowledge. How might such a piece of selfknowledge show itself?
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Here is one short, poetic fragment of Holderlin's—"The fruits are ripe . . .
[Reif sind . . . ]"—that seems to me to show such self-knowledge. It comes from
a collection of fragments reconstructed by D. E. Sattler in editing the Frankfurt
edition of Holderlin's works and given the title Aprioritat des Individuellen, as though
this collection of fragments addressed the question of what necessities govern any
individual human life. Here is the entire fragment:
Reif sind . . .
Reif sind, in Feuer getaucht, ^ekochet
Die Friicht und auf der Erde ^eprufet und ein Gesez ist
Das alles hinein^eht, Schlan^en ^leich,
Prophetisch, traumend auf
Den Hii^eln des Himmels. Und vieles
Wie auf den Schultem eine
Last von Scheitem ist
Zu behalten. Aher bos sind
Die Pfade. Nemfich unrecht
Wie Rosse, ^ehn die ^efan^enen
Element' und alten
Geseze der Erd. Und immer
Ins Ungebundende gebet eine Sehnsucht. Vieles aber ist
Zu bebalten. Und Noth die Treue.
Vorwiirts aber und rukwarts wollen wir
Nicht sehn. Uns wiegen lassen, wie
Auf schwankem Kahne der See.^^
The fruits are ripe . . .
The fruits are ripe, dipped in fire, cooked
And tested here on earth, and it is a law.
Prophetic, that all things pass
Like snakes, dreaming on
The hills of heaven.
And as
A load of logs upon
The shoulders, there is much
To bear in mind. But the paths
Are evil. For like horses
The captive elements
And ancient laws
Of the earth go astray. Yet always
The longing to reach beyond bounds. But much
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To be retained. And loyalty a must.
But we shall not look forward
Or back. Let ourselves rock, as
On a boat, lapped by the waves.
Against the background of the post-Kantian (Holderlinian, romantic, Wittgensteinian-Cavellian) conception of mind and language, it is fairly straightfor
ward to parse much of this fragment. Our lives are lived out amid already afforded
ways of culture—ripe fruits—that are themselves formed somehow by both natural
processes (growth and ripening) and self-conscious agency (dipping and cooking).
Present human action and speech are further natural-agentive refigurings (ripen
ings and cookings) of these affordances. They have no pure, self-present origin in
either nature alone or culture alone but instead arise both naturally and culturally
out of already past interplays.
Both prior cultural affordances and present actions pass away or go under
{hineinpeht), into the earth like snakes, or into oblivion. There is no possibility of
present immortality for us, in and through our actions in culture. It is chastening
to recognize this. This recognition is a burden (Last) to be borne in mind, or kept
(zu behalten). Though the burden is heavy, holding it fosters humility.
We cannot, however, simply stand and hold the burden. There are paths—
ways of culture—on which we are always already in motion. Only to stand and
wait, quietistically, is also to act, as long as one bears conceptual consciousness
and the possibility of attitudes toward the world. To go on these paths—to take
up and modify one cultural affordance rather than another—is to move in a specific
cultural direction. This has its costs, in ignoring both others outside one's specific
cultural orbit and aspects of oneself that might engage with those others. A life
of universal, reciprocal freedom and acknowledgment is not to be attained from
within individual modifications of culturally afforded specific patterns of action.
Playing the cello, organizing for better housing, working in a soup kitchen, par
ticipating in communion, raising ones children, telling jokes, comforting the sick,
seeking and offering forgiveness—none of these activities is free from partiality,none is a sure and straight road toward human freedom: toward community and in
dependence, love and selfhood. Hence the paths are "evil." That is to say (nmlich),
they go astray, or are not right, or are unsuitable (unrecht), like horses we cannot
control. What we have managed to build and accomplish on these paths (the
captive elements) fails to match or express the deeper necessities and possibilities
of freedom (the ancient laws of earth). Or our accomplishments are informed by
the ancient law of their partiality, their one-sidedness that will lead them to go
under. There is no perfect remembrance and enactment of freedom along these
paths of culture.
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Yet still we wish for our lives in culture to be straightened, informed wholly
by what is eternal, so that they are rationally transparent and in good order, to
ourselves and to others. W^e wish to act on standing good reasons that can be
endorsed reflectively by everyone, no matter what: always the longing to reach
beyond bounds." In this too there is much to be retained, held; the facts of human
desire for rational transparency and of the limits in fulfilling that desire that lie
along its tangled, crossed paths. These facts now present themselves as facts of
conceptual consciousness as such, as facts of our lives with thought and language
as we inherit and extend them. We must retain, hold, both the fact of our partiality
and the fact of our standing desire to overcome it.
In this condition, it will be necessary to trust certain ways of culture as the
best, the most sure vehicles for the expression and cultivation of freedom that
one has to hand (Und Noth die Treue). One should not step back from cultural
engagements—from cello playing, political organizing, feeding the poor, telling
jokes—into an empty, skeptical-solipsistic rejection of the value of anything that
is present. Yet we cannot quite help doing this sometimes, in our awareness of the
rational one-sidedness of any cultural affordances and present actions.
In this necessity and impossibility of trust of the common lies the difficulty
and accuracy of the fragment's final three lines. What does the toollen at the end of
the fifteenth line mean? The translator offers "shall," and this captures one sense
of wollen: to be about to do something or to be on the point of doing it. This
reading captures a sense of resoluteness in acceptance of the common, of what is
already culturally afforded, as at least of partial value: We shall let ourselves be
rocked by it, carried by it out of our skeptical resistances. It is unavoidable. Yet
wollen also carries an even stronger sense of wanting, willing, or wishing. We want
to let ourselves be carried by culture, want not to look forward or backward but
instead to abandon ourselves to the common, or even to allow ourselves to be
swept away by an unusual destiny in a blue sea of August: anything to move out
of mere onlooking, alone. This sounds less honorable, as the skeptical voice has
always intimated. Perhaps we should rather owe loyalty also to the fact of our
desire to reach beyond bounds, to our possibilities of judging and refiguring the
present. Though we want not to look forward and back and want instead only to
drift over the infinite of the sea, we must also hold and retain our desire to go down
into the infinite, to hold our present ways to account.
So which is it, and what are we to trust—the ways of culture as they present
themselves to us in their partial value or our powers of assessment and refiguration,
of looking forward and backward and accepting and pursuing agentive control?
It is Holderlin’s special and difficult expression of the post-Kantian sense of our
mindedness to have posed these alternatives in the very same words, thus letting
us see the appeal of each mode of trust as we swerve between the sense of each
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reading. It is this enactment of our mindedness, I want to say, to which our immigrancy in mind and language and culture comes. But, if this is right, then that is
not something for anyone simply to say.
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